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tive subject-matterof jurisdiction-and if it is, why should not the
act of dissolving it be recognised in a foreign jurisdiction; hence
it is that two other questions are involved, namely, whether or not
marriage is a status ; and secondly, the effect of an ex parte decree
of divorce; because if alimony is an incident of a divorce, and only
grantable in the divorce proceeding, it should be allowed in an ex
parte divorce proceeding, if such proceeding is valid, and it will be
valid if marriage is a status and that status is a jurisdictional sub-
ject-matter. And if it is not valid, if granted in an ex parte
divorce proceeding, it cannot be said to be incident to a divorce.
Or, in other words, alimony is incident to a divorce if it can be
granted in a valid exparte divorce, and it is not incident if it can-
not be so granted.
Perhaps the solution is that marriage is a status, hence an ex
parte divorce is valid because it acts upon this status. Alimony
cannot be decreed ex parte, because it is different from the thing
"c status," and there is no jurisdiction to decree in personam in ex
parte proceedings; hence it can be decreed after an ex parte
divorce or else there would be a failure of justice. Alimony can-
not be decreed after a divorce inter parties, because the court then
has jurisdiction of the status and the person, and hence all matters
involved, or could have been involved, must be adjudicated. The
questions, whether or not marriage is a status, and the validity
and effect of an ex parte divorce, are connected with this doctrine
of domicile.
JNo. F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
House of Lords.
JOHN WESTON FOAKES v. JULIA BEER.
An agreement between judgment debtor and creditor that, in consideration of the
debtor paying down part of the judgment debt and costs, and on condition of his
paying to the creditor, or his nominee, the residue by instalments the creditor will
not take any proceedings on the judgment, is nudum pactum, being without con-
sideration, and does not prevent the creditor, after payment of the whole debt and
costs, from proceeding to enforce payment of the interest upon the judgment.
Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117 a., and Cumber v. Wane, I Str. 426, followed.
An agreement not to take proceedings if the debtor shall pay certain specified
instalments "until the whole of the said sum of 20901. 19s. shall have been fully
paid," the said sum being the principal alone without interest, gives the creditor no
tight to interest if the condition as to payment of instalments is fulfilled.
FOAKES v. BEER.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of Appeal.
On the 11th of August 1875, the respondent recovered judg-
ment against the appellant for 20771. 17s. 2d. for debt, and 131.
Is. 10d. for costs. On the 21st of December 1876, a memorandum
of agreement was made and signed by. the appellant and respondent
in the following terms:
"Whereas, the said John Weston Foakes is indebted to the said
Julia Beer, and she has. obtained a judgment in Her Majesty's
High Court of Justice, Exchequer Division, for the sum of 20901.
19s. And whereas the said John Weston Foakes has requested
the said Julia Beer to give him time in which to pay such judg-
ment, which she has agreed to do on the following conditibns:
Now this agreement witnesseth, that in consideration of the said
John Weston Foakes paying to the said Julia Beer, on the signing
of this agreement, the sum of 5001., the receipt whereof she doth
hereby acknowledge, in part satisfaction of the said judgment debt
of 20901. 19s., and on condition of his paying to her or her execu-
tors, administrators, assigns or nominee the sum of 1501., on the
1st day of July and the 1st day of January, or within one calendat
month after each of the said days respectively in every year, until
the whole of the said sum of 20901. 19s. shall have been fully paid
and satisfied; the first of such payments to be made on the 1st day
of July next, then she, the said Julia Beer, hereby undertakes and
agrees that she, her executors, administrators or assigns will not
take any proceedings whatever on the said judgment."
The respondent having in June 1882 taken out a summons for
leave to proceed on the judgment, an issue was directed to be tried
between the respondent, as plaintiff, and the appellant, as defendant,
whether any and what amount was, on the 1st of July 1882, due
upon the judgment.
At the trial of the issue before CAVE, J., it was proved that the
whole sum of 20901. 19s. had been paid by instalments, but t$e
respondent claimed interest. The jury, under his lordship's
direction, found that the appellant had paid all the sums which, by
the agreement of the 21st of December 1876, he undertook to pay,
and within the times therein specified. CAVE, J., was of opinion that,
whether the judgment was satisfied or not, the respondent was, by
reason of the agreement, not entitled to issue execution for any
sum on the judgment. 
."
The Queen's Bench Division (WATKIN WILLIAMS and MATHm,
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JJ.) discharged an order for a new trial on the ground of misdi-
rection.
The Court of Appeal (BRETT, M. R., LINDLEY and FRY, L. JJ.)
reversed that decision and entered judgment for the respondent for
the interest due with costs.
W H. oll, Q. C., for appellant.
Bompas, Q. C., for respondent.
EARL OF SELBORNE, L. 0.-My Lords, upon the construction of
the agreement of the 21st of December 1876, I cannot differ from
the conclusion in which both the courts below were agreed. If the
operative part could properly be controlled by the recitals, I think
there would be much reason to say that the only thing contem-
plated by the recitals was giving time for payment, without any
relinquishment, on the part of the judgment creditor, of any por-
tion of the amount recoverable (whether for principal or for interest)
under the judgment. But the agreement of the judgment creditor,
which follows the recital, is that she "will not take any proceedings
whatever on the judgment" if a certain condition is fulfilled.
What is that condition? Payment of the sum of 1501. in every
half year, "until the whole of the said sum of 20901. 19s." (the
aggregate amount of the principal debt and costs, for which judg-
ment had been entered) "shall have been fully paid and satisfied."
A particular "sum" is here mentioned, which does not include
the interest then due or future interest. Whatever was meant to
be payable at all, under this agreement, was clearly to be payable
by half-yearly instalments of 1501. each; any other construction
must necessarily make the conditional promise nugatory. But to
say that the half-yearly payments were to continue till the whole
sum of 20901. 19s., "and interest thereon," should have been fully
paid and satisfied, would be to introduce very important words into
the agreement, which are not there, and of which I cannot say that
they are necessarily implied. Although, therefore, I may (as
indeed I do) very much doubt whether the effect of the agreement,
as a conditional waiver of the interest to which she was by law
entitled under the judgment, was really present to the mind of the
judgment creditor, still I cannot deny that it might have that
effect, if capable of being legally enforced.
But the question remains, whether the agreement is capable of
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being legally enforced. Not being under seal, it cannot be legally
enforced against the respondent unless she received consideration
for it from the appellant, or unless, though without consideration,
it operates by way of accord and satisfaction, so as to extinguish
the claim for interest. What is the consideration ? On the face
of the agreement none is expressed except a present payment of
5001., on account and in part of the larger debt then due and pay-
able by law under the judgment. The appellant did not contract
to pay the future instalments of 1501. each, at the times therein
mentioned; much less did he give any new security, in the shape
of negotiable paper, or in any other form. The promise defuturo
was only that of the respondent, that if the half-yearly payments
of 1501. each were regularly paid, she would "take no proceedings
whatever on the judgment." No doubt if the appellant had been
under no antecedent obligation to pay the whole debt, his fulfil-
ment of the condition might have imported some consideration on
his part for that promise. But he was under that dntecedent obli-
gation; and payment at those deferred dates, by the forbearance
and indulgence of the creditor, of the residue of the principal debt
and costs, could not, in my opinion, be a consideration for the
relinquishment of interest and discharge of the judgment, unless
the payment of the 5001., at the time of signing the agreement, was
such a consideration. As to accord and satisfaction, in point of fact
there could be no complete satisfaction so long as any future instal-
ment remained payable; and I do not see how any mere payments on
account could operate in law as a satisfaction ad interim, con-
ditionally upon other payments being afterwards duly made, unless
there was a consideration sufficient to support the agreement while
still unexecuted. Nor was anything, in fact, done by the respond-
ent in this case, on the receipt of the last payment, which could be
tantamount to an acquittance, if the agreement did not previously
bind her.
The question, therefore, is nakedly raised by this appeal, whether
your lordships are now prepared, not only to overrule as contrary
to law, the doctrine stated by Sir EDWARD COKE to have been laid
down by all the judges of the Common Pleas, in Pinnel's Case in
1602, and repeated in his note to Littleton, sect. 844; but to treat
a prospective agreement, not under seal, for satisfaction of a debt,
by a series of payments on account to a total amount less than the
whole debt, as binding in law, provided those payments are regu-
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larly made; the case not being one of a composition with a common
debtor, agreed to, inter se, by several creditors. I prefer so to
state the quiestion instead of treating it (as pat at the bar) as de-
pending on the authority of Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426, decided
in 1718. It may well be that distinctions, which in later cases
have been held sufficient to exclude the application of that doctrine,
existed and .were improperly disregarded in Cumber v. Wane;
and yet that the doctrine itself may be law, rightly recognised in
Cumber v. Wane, and not really contradicted by any later authori-
ties. And this appears to me to be the true state of the case: The
doctrine itself, as laid down by Sir EDWARD COKE, may have been
criticised as questionable in principle, by some persons whose opin-
iong are entitled to respect, but it has never been judicially over-
ruled; on the contrary, I think it has always, since the sixteenth
century, been accepted aA law. If so, I cannot think that your
lordships would do right, if you were now to reverse as erroneous a
judgment of the Court of Appeal, proceeding upon a doctrine
which has been accepted as part of the law of England for two
hundred and eighty years.
The doctrine, as stated in Pinnel's Case is "that payment of a
lesser sum on the day" (it would of course be the same after the
day), " in satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction for
the whole, because it appears to the judges, that by no possibility
a lesser sum can be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater
sum." As stated in Coke Littleton 212, it is, "where the condi-
tion is for payment of 201. the obligor or feoffor cannot at the time
appointed pay a lesser sum in satisfaction of the whole, because it
is apparent that a lesser sum of money cannot be a satisfaction of a
greater;" adding (what is beyond controversy), that an acquittance
under seal, in full satisfaction of the whole, would (under like cir-
cumstances) be valid and binding.
The distinction between the effect of a deed under seal, and that
of an agreement by parol, or by writing not under seal may seem
arbitrary, but it is established in our law; nor is it really unreason-
able or practically inconvenient that the law should require particular
solemnities to give to a gratuitous contract the force of a binding
obligation. If the question be (as in the actual state of the law, I
think it is), whether consideration is or is not given in a case of
this kind, by the debtor who pays down part of the debt presently
due from him, for a promise by the creditor to relinquish, after
VOL. XXXIII.-4
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certain further payments on account, the residue of the debt, I can-
not say that I think consideration is given, in the sense in which I
have always understood that word as used in our law. It might be
(and indeed I think it would be) an improvement in our law, if a
release or acquittance of the whole debt, on payment of any sum
which the creditor might be content to receive by way of accord
and satisfaction (though less than the whole), were held to be, gen-
erally, binding, though not under seal; nor should I be unwilling
to see equal force given to a prospective agreement, like the present,
in writing though not under seal; but I think it impossible, with-
out refinements which practically alter the sense of the word, to
treat such a release or acquittance as supported by any new con-
sideration proceeding from the debtor. All the authorities sub-
sequent to the case of Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 246, which were
relied upon by the appellant at your Lordships' Bar (such as Sib-
ree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23; (Jurlewis v. Olark, 3 Ex. 375, and
aoddard v. O'Brien, 9 Q. B. Div. 37), have proceeded upon the
distinction, that, by giving negotiable paper or otherwise, there had
been some new consideration for a new agreement, distinct from
mere money payments in or towards discharge of the original liabil-
ity. I think it unnecessary to go through those cases, or to examine
the particular grounds on which each of them was decided. There
are no such facts in the case now before your Lordships. What is
called "any benefit, or even any legal possibility of benefit," in
Mr. Smith's notes to Cumber v. Wane, is not (as I conceive) that
sort of benefit which a creditor may derive from getting payment
of part of the money due to him from a debtor who might other-
wise keep him at arm's length, or possibly become insolvent, but is
some independent benefit, actual or contingent, of a kind which
might in law be a good and valuable consideration for any other
sort of agreement not under seal.
My conclusion is, that the order appealed from should be
affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, with costs, and I so move your
Lordships.
Lord BLACKBUN.-My Lords, the first question raised is as to
what was the true construction of the memorandum of agreement
made on the 21st of December 1876. What was it that the parties
by that writing agreed to ?
The appellants contend that they meant that on payment down
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of 5001., and payment within a month after the 1st day of July
and the 1st day of January in each ensuing year of 1501. until the
sum of 20901. 19s. was paid, the judgment for that sum and interest
should be satisfied, for an agreement to take no proceedings on the
judgment is equivalent to treating it as satisfied. This construc-
tion of the memorandum requires that after the tenth payment of
1501. there should be a further payment of 901. 19s. made within.
the next six months. This is the construction which all three
courts below have put upon the memorandum.
The respondent contends that the true construction of the memo-
randum was that time was to be given on those conditions for five
years, the judgment being on default of any one payment enforce-
able for whatever was still unpaid, with interest from the date the
judgment was signed, but that the interest was not intended to be
forgiven at all.
If this is the true construction of the agreement the judgment
appealed against is right and should be affirmed, whether the reason
on which the Court of Appeal founded its judgment was right or
not. I am, however, of opinion that the courts below, who on this
point were unanimous, put the true construction on the memoran-
dum. I do not think the question free from difficulty. It would
have been easy to have expressed, in unmistakable words, that on
payment down of 5001., and punctual payment at the rate of 3001.
a year till 20901. 19s. was paid, the judgment should not be
enforced either for principal or interest; or language might have
been used which should equally clearly have expressed that though
time was to be given, interest was to be paid in addition to the
instalments. The words actually used are such that I think it is
quite possible ihat the two parties put a different construction on
the words at the time; but I think the words, "till the said sum of
20901. 19s. shall have been fully paid and satisfied" cannot be con-
strued as meaning "till that sum, with interest from the day judg-
ment was signed, shall have been fully paid and satisfied," nor can
the promise "not to take any proceedings whatever on the judg-
ment" be cut down to meaning any proceedings except those
necessary to enforce payment of interest.
I think, therefore, that it is necessary to consider the ground on
which the Court of Appeal did base their judgment, and to say
whether the agreement can be enforced. I construe it as accepting
and taking 5001. in satisfaction of the whole 20901. 19s., subject
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to the condition that unless the balance of the principal debt was
paid by instalments, the whole might be enforced with interest. If,
instead of 5001. in money, it had been a horse valued at 5001., or
a promissory note for 5001., the authorities are that it would have
been a good satisfaction; but it is said to be otherwise, as it was
money. This is a question, I think, of' difficulty.
In Coke Littleton 212 b., Lord CoKE says : " Wrere the con-
dition is for payment of 201., the obligor or feoffor cannot at the time
appointed pay a lesser sum in satisfaction of the whole, because it is
apparent that a lesser sum of money cannot be a satisfaction of a
greater. * * If the obligor or feoffor pay a lesser sum either before
the day or at another place than is limited by the condition, and the
obligee or feoffee receiveth it, this is a good satisfaction." For this
he cites Pinnei's Case. That was an action on a bond for
161., conditioned for the payment of 81. '0s., on the 11th of
November 1600. Plea that defendant, at plaintiff's request,
before the said day, to wit, on the 1st of October, paid to
the plaintiff 5l. 28. 2d., which the plaintiff accepted in full satis-
faction of the 81. 108. The plaintiff had judgment for the insuffi-
cient pleading. But though this was so, Lord CoKE reports that it
was resolved by the whole Court of Common Pleas, "that payment
of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any
satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the judges that by
no possibility a lesser sum can be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for
a greater sum: but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, &c., in satis-
faction is good, for it shall be intended that a horse, hawk, 'or robe,
&c., might be more beneficial to the plaintiff than the money, in
respect of some circumstance, or otherwise the plaintiff would not
have accepted of it in satisfaction. But when the whole sum is due,
by no intendment the acceptance of parcel can be a satisfaction
to the plaintiff; but in the case at bar it was resolved that the pay-
ment and acceptance of parcel before the day in satisfaction of the
whole, would be a good -satisfaction in regard of circumstance of
time ; for peradventure parcel of -it before the day would be more
beneficial -to him than the whole at the day, -and the value of the
satisfaction 'is not material ; so, if I am bound in 201. to pay you
101. at Westminster, and you request -me to pay you 51. at the day
at York, and you will accept in full satisfaction for the whole 101.,
it is a good satisfaction for the whole, for the expenses to pay it at
York is sufficient satisfaction."
FOAKES v. BEER.
There are two things here resolved. First, that where a matter
paid and accepted in satisfaction of a debt certain, might by any
possibility be more beneficial to the creditor than his debt, the court
will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration. If the
creditor, without any fraud, accepted it in satisfaction when it was
not a sufficient satisfaction, it was his own fault. And that pay-
ment before the day might be more beneficial, and consequently
that the plea was in substance good, and this must have been decided
in the case.
There is a second point stated to have been resolved, viz. : "1 That
payment of a lesser sum on the day cannot be any satisfaction of the
whole, because it appears to the judges that by no possibility a
lesser sum can be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater sum."
This was certainly not necessary for the decision of the case; but
though the resolution of the Court of Common Pleas was only a
dictum, it seems to me clear that Lord COKE deliberately adopted
the dictum, and the great weight of his authority makes it neces-
sary to be cautious before saying that what he deliberately adopted
as law was a mistake; and though I cannot find that in any subse-
quent case this dictum has been made the ground of the decision,
except in Pitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230, as to whicfi I shall make
some remarks later; and in Down v. Ratcher, 10 A. & E. 121,
as to which PARKE, B., in Oooper v. Parker, 15. C. B. 828, said:
"Whenever the question may arise as to whether Down v. Hatcher
is good law, I should have a great deal to say against it," yet there
certainly are cases in which great judges have treated the dictum in
Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117 a., as good law.
For instance, in Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 33, PARKE, B., says:
"It is clear if the claim be a liquidated and ascertained sum, pay-
ment of part cannot be satisfaction of the whole, although it may,
under certain circumstances, be evidence of a gift of the remainder."
And A.LDERSON, B., in the same case says: "It is undoubtedly true
that paymenqt of a portion of a liquidated demand, in the same manner
as the whole liquidated demand which ought to be paid, is payment
only in part, because it is not one bargain, but two; viz., payment
of part, and an agreement without consideration to give up the
residue. The court might very well have held the contrary, and
have left the matter to the agreement of the parties, but undoubtedly
the law is so settled." After such strong expressions of opinion,
I doubt much whether any judge sitting in a court of the first
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instance would be justified in treating the question as open. But
as this has very seldom, if at all, been the ground of the decision
even in a court of the first instance, and certainly never been the
ground of a decision in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, still less
in this house, I did think it open in your lordship's house to
reconsider this question. And, notwithstanding the very high
authority of Lord COKE, I think it is not the fact that to accept
prompt payment of a part only of a liquidated demand, can never
be more beneficial than to insist on payment of the whole. And,
if it be not the fact, it cannot be apparent to the judges.
I will first examine the authorities. If a defendant pleaded the
general issue, the plaintiff could join issue at once, and, if the case
was not defended, get his verdict at the next assizes. But by
pleading a special plea, the plaintiff was obliged to reply, and the
defendant often caused the plaintiff, merely by the delay occasioned
by replying, to lose an assize. If the replication was one to which
he could demur, he made this sure. Strangely enough, it seems
long to have been thought that if the defendant kept within reason-
able bounds, neither he nor his lawyers were to blame in getting
time in this way by a sham plea,-that a chattel was given and ac-
cepted in satisfaction of the debt. The recognised forms were giving
and accepting in satisfaction a beaver hat (Young v. _Rudd, 5 Mod.
86), or a pipe of wine. All this is now antiquated. But whilst it con-
tinued to be the practice, the plea founded on the first part of the
resolution in Pinnel's Case were very common, and that law was
perfectly trite. No one for a moment supposed that a beaver hat
was really given and accepted; but every one knew that the- law
was that if it was really given and accepted, it was a good satisfac-
tion. But special pleas, founded on the other resolution in Pinnel's
Case, on what I have ventured to call the dictum, were certainly
not common. I doubt if a real defence of this sort was ever
specially pleaded. When there really was a question as to whether
a debt was satisfied by a payment of a smaller sum, the defendant
pleaded the general issue, and if it was proved to the satisfaction
of the jury that a smaller sum had been paid and accepted in satis-
faction of a greater, if objection was raised the jury might, perhaps,
as suggested by HOLROYD, J., in Thomas v. Beatiorn, 2 B. &
C. 482, find that the circumstances were such that the legal effect
was to be as if the whole was paid down and a portion thrown
back as a God's-penny. This, however, seems to me to be an
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unsatisfactory and artificial way of avoiding the effect of the dictum,
and it could not be applied to such an agreement as that now before
this house.
For whatever reason it was, I know of no case in which the
question was raised whether a payment of a lesser sum could be
satisfaction of a liquidated demand, from Pinnel's Case down to
Cumber v. Wane, 5 Geo. I., a period of one hundred and fifteen
years.
In Adams v. Tapling, 4 Mod. 88, where the plea was bad for
many other reasons, it is reported to have been said by the court,
that: "In covenant where the damages are uncertain, and to be
recovered, as in this case, a lesser thing may be done in satisfac-
tion, and there ' accord and satisfaction' is a good plea." No
doubt, this was one of the cases which PARKE, B., would have cited
in support of his opinion, that Down v. Hatcher was not good law.
The court are said to have gone on to recognise the dictum in Pin-
nel's Case, or at least not to dissent from it, but it was not the
ground of their decision. In every other reported case which I
have seen the question arose on a demurrer to a replication to what
was obviously a sham or dilatory plea.
Some doubt has been made as to what the pleadings in Cumber
v. Wane really were. I have obtained the record. The plea is,
that after the promises aforesaid, and before the issuing of the
writ, it was agreed between the said George and Edward Cumber,
that he, the said George, "daret eidem Edwardo Cumber quandm
notam in script vocatam 'a promissory note,' manu propria ipsius
aeorgii subscript pr. solucon eidem -Edwardo Cumber vel ordini
quinque librarum," fourteen days after date, in full satisfaction and
exoneration of the premises and promises, which said note in
writing the said George then gave to the said Edward Cumber, and
the said Edward Cumber then and there received from the said
George the said note in full satisfaction and discharge of the premises
and promises.
The replication is that, "the said George did not give to him,
Edward, any note in writing called a promissory note, with the
hand of him, George, subscribed for the payment to him, Edward,
or his order of 51., fourteen days after date, in full satisfaction and
discharge of the premises and promises." To this there is a de-
murrer and judgment in the Common Pleas for the plaintiff "that
the replication was good in law."
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The Reporter, oddly enough, says there was an immaterial replica-
tion. The effect of the replication is to put in issue the substance of
the defence, namely, the giving in satisfaction: Young v. _Budd, 5
Mod. 86, and certainly that was not immaterial. But for some
reason, I do not stop to inquire what, PRATT, C. J., prefers to base
the judgment affirming that of the Common Pleas on the supposed
badness of the plea rather than on the sufficiency of the replication.
It is impossible to doubt that the note, which it is averred in the
plea was given as satisfaction, was a negotiable note. And, there-
fore, this case is in direct conflict with Sibree v. Tripp.
Two cases require to be carefully considered. The first is Heath-
cote v. Crookshanks, 2 T. R. 24. The plea there pleaded would,
I think, now be held perfectly good, see Norman v. Thompson, 4
Ex. 755; but BULLER, J., seems to have thought otherwise. He
says, "thirdly, it was said that all the creditors were bound by
this agreement to forbear, but that is not stated by the plea. It is
only alleged that they agreed to take a certain proportion, but that
is a nudum pactum, unless they had afterwards accepted it. In
the case in which (umber v. Wane was denied to be law (Hard-
castle v. Howard, 26 Geo. III., B. R.), the party actually accepted.
But as the plaintiff in the present case refused to take less than
the whole demand, the plea is clearly bad."
That decision goes entirely on the ground that accord without
satisfaction is not a plea. I do not think it can be fairly said that
BULLER, J., meant by saying "that is a nudum pactum, unless
they had afterwards accepted it," to express an opinion that if the
dividend had been accepted it would have been a good satisfaction.
But he certainly expresses no opinion the other way.
In -Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230, not only did the plaintiff not
accept the payment of the dividend in satisfaction, but refused
to accept it at all, unless the defendant promised to pay him the
balance when of ability, and the defendant assented and made
the promise required, so that but for the fact that other cred-
itors were parties to the composition there could have been no
defence. There was no point of pleading in that case, the whole
being open under the general issue. And in Steinman v. Mag-
nus, 11 East 390, it was pretty well admitted by Lord
ELLENBOROUGH, that the decision in Fitch v. Sutton would have
been the other way, if they had understood the evidence as the
Reporter did. But though this misapprehension of the judges as
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to the facts, and the absence of any acceptance of the dividend,
greatly weaken the weight of Fitch v. Sutton, still it remainis that
Lord ELLENBOROUGH, a very great judge indeed, did, however
hasty or unnecessary it may have been to express such an opinion,
say, "It is impossible to contend that acceptance of 171. 10s. is an
extinguishment of a debt of 501. There must be some considera-
tion for the relinquishment of the residue; something collateral, to
show a possibility of benefit to the party relinquishing his further
claim, otherwise the agreement is nudum pactum. But the mere
promise to pay the rest when of ability put the plaibtiff in no better
condition than he was before. It was expressly determined in
Cumber v. Wane, that acceptance of a security for a lesser sum
cannot be pleaded in satisfaction of a similar security for a greater.
And though that case was said by me in argument in Hleatheote v.
Crookshianks, to have been denied to be law, and in confirmation
of that, BULLER, J., afterwards referred to a case, stated to be
that of Hardoastle v. Howard, 26 Geo. III., yet I cannot find any
case of that sort, and none has been now referred to; on the con-
trary the decision in Cumber v. Wane, is directly supported by the
authority of Pinnel's 'Case, which never appears to have been
questioned.
I must observe that, whether Cumber v. Wane was or was not
denied to be law in Hardeastle v. Howard, it certainly was denied
to be law in Sibree v. Tripp, and that, though it is quite true that
Pinnel's Case, as far as regards the points actually raised in the
case, has not only never been questioned, but is often assented to,
I am not aware that in any case before Fitch v. Sutton, unless it
be Cumber v. Wane, has that part of it which I venture to call the
dictum ever been acted upon; and as I have pointed out, had it not
been for the composition with other creditors, there could have been
no defence in Fitch v. Sutton, whether the dictum in Pinnel's Case
was right or wrong.
Still this is an authority, and I have no doubt that it was on the
ground of this authority, and the adhesion of BAYLEY, J., to it in
Thomas v. Heathorn,. that Barons PARKE and ALDERSON expressed
themselves as they did in the passages I have cited from Sibree v.
Tripp. And I think that their expressions justify Mr. John
William Smith in laying it down as he does in his note to Cumber
v. Wane, in the second edition of his Leading Cases, that, "a liqui-
dated and undisputed money demand, of which the day of pay-
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